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NLRB-FEPC?
Jeffrey M. Albert*
The pressures surrounding racial discrimination in employment have
been increasing in recent years. In this article the author discusses the
ability of the NLRB to deal with some of these problems. He summarizes significant past developments and analyzes the statutory provisions which may empower NLRB action to combat discrimination.
He concludes that affirmative action is possible within the existing
statutory framework.
I. INTRODUCTION

Racial discrimination in employment opportunities is probably the
most intractable of all forms of racial intolerance, in the sense that it
breeds upon job insecurity as well as upon prejudice. The nature and
extent of this discrimination' and the many ways in which the present
high rate of unemployment has aggravated its effects2 have been well
documented.
On the federal level ameliorative action has been limited. The
many FEPC-type bills introduced in the 87th Congress were foredoomed. 3 Although at least one such bill introduced in the 88th
* LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M. (Labor), New York University. The author is
presently in practice in New York City.
1. See Equal Employment Opportunity, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on

Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
Hearings on H.R. 8219 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); GRENBaERG, RAcE RELATiONS
AND AMEucA
LAW 170-86 (1959); Rucwm~s, RACE, JoBs AND PoL.rncs (1953);
U.S. CoMM'N ON CiviL RiGHTs, EMPLOYMENT (1961); WEvER, NEGRO LABOR
(1946); WESLEY, NEGRO LA OR IN TH UurrED STATES (1927).
2. S. REP. No. 1206, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-85 (1960); SENATE SPECIAL CoMM.
ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, 86T" CONG., 2d SEss., STurIEs IN UNEMPLOYMENT 173-223 (1960); SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, 86TH
CONe., 1sT SESS., READINGS IN UNENLOYMENT 872-973 (1960). The Commission
on Civil Rights has noted that "the rate of unemployment for Negroes ... was twice
that of the white population during the recent [1960] recession. In some cities more
than one-third of the Negro work-force was unemployed. The old adage that Negroes
are the last hired and the first fired was all too clearly demonstrated. One of the
reasons for this is that, despite a dramatic increase in types of employment available
to Negroes during the past 20 years, the mass of Negro workers are still confined
largely to the less skilled jobs." U.S. COMM'N ON Crvm R GTs, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 1-2.
3. S. 2595, S. 1258, S. 1819, H.R. 8219, H.R. 104, H.R. 262, H.R. 670, H.R. 2022,
H.R. 2475, H.R. 2744, H.R. 2867, H.R. 5875, H.R. 6041, H.R. 6875, H.R. 7090,
H.R. 7252, H.R. 9268, H.R. 9269, H.R. 9270, H.R. 9327, H.R. 9344, H.R. 9345.
See CCH CONG. INDEX, 87TH CONG., 1962-63.
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Congress has impressive individual support,4 there is no evidence that

it will fare any better.5 The Administration's overt activity has been
restricted largely to the enforcement of Executive Order 109256 which

bars employment7 discrimination by the Government and by govern-

ment contractors.
Unions also have a heavy responsibility in this area. Yet it is

certainly accurate to say that there are "many imperfections and
shortcomings with respect to nondiscrimination"8 in the union move-

ment. In order to correct this situation the AFL-CIO has stepped up
its educational program, 9 but it has rejected the remedy of disaffiliation for offending unions. 10 Some unions, notably the United Auto
Workers, have their own antidiscrimination enforcement machinery. 1'
The extent and effect of union attempts to eliminate racial discrimination through the collective bargaining process and of voluntary employer efforts to the same end have not been documented and
thus cannot be assessed.
One potential agency in the attack on racial discrimination in

employment is the National Labor Relations Board. The President
has indicated that substantial reliance will be placed on that agency

for the vindication of Negro rights in areas of employment not covered by Executive Order 10925.12 Less than a year. ago the board's
approach in this area was cautious and its proper role ill-defined
4. S. 773 was introduced by Senators Clark, Hart, Douglas, Williams (N.J.), Javits,
Long (Mo.), Humphrey, Gruening, Neuberger, Scott, Case, and Pell. Other bills
pending in the 88th Congress are: S. 1210, H.R. 27, H.R. 316, H.R. 330, H.R. 405, H.R.
1623, H.R. -1767, H.R. 1938, H.R. 2999, H.R. 3523, H.R. 3571, H.R. 4031, H.R. 4573,
and H.R. 4874. See CCH CONG. INDEX, 88=- CONG., 1963-64.
5. The administration's civil rights message to the 88th Congress, delivered
February 28, 1963, indicated there would be no request for such legislation. Civil
Rights Message from the President, Feb. 28, 1963, H.R. Doc. No. 75, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9. More recently there has been some suggestion that such a request might be
made. Civil Rights Message from the President, June 19, 1963, H.R. Doc. No. 124,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 11.
6. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
7. The Administration has recently indicated that its activities in this area will be
broadened. See Civil Rights Message, June 19, 1963, supra note 5, at pp. 10-11.
8. Subcommittee to Review the Memorandum on Civil Rights in the AFL-CIO,
Report to the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, submitted by Vice President
Randolph to the executive council at its meeting at Unity House, Pa., June 25-30,
1961, p. 8 (mimeo. 1961). See also U.S. COIMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note
1, at 127-51.
9. Subcommittee to Review the Memorandum on Civil Rights in the AFL-CIO,
supra note 8 passim.
10. George Meaney, president of the AFL-CIO, urging the adoption of equal
employment opportunity legislation to Congress, testified that disaffiliation was not an
effective remedy. Equal Employment Opportunity, supra note 1, at 993-94.
11. DANmEsT, CoNTF.NPOP,,nRy UNIONISM 189 (1948); U.S. COAINI'N ON CIVIL
Rirorrs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 141.
12. Civil Rights Message, Feb. 28, 1963, supra note 5, at p. 9; Civil Rights Message,
June 19, 1963, supra note 5, at p. 10.
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and speculative.' 3 Within the past year, however, the NLRB
has moved rapidly by sharpening four, possibly five, anti-bias
remedies. Three have roots in early NLRB decisions. The fourth
is new. The fifth, resurrection of which has only been hinted at so far,
is also derived from early Board decisions.
The first three of these remedies are (a) the decertification of
unions which discriminate against Negroes, 14 (b) the setting aside
of representation elections where an employer or a union makes
"exacerbated" appeals to racial bias, 15 and (c) the removal of discriminatory collective bargaining contracts as bars to representation
petitions by stranger unions.' 6 The fourth consists of the Board's
preventing a union, when acting in its "statutory representative
capacity, from taking action against any employee upon considerations
or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 17 Similarly,
employer participation in such action may be remedied.' 8 The fifth
remedy would make it an unfair labor practice for an employer or a
union to make such exacerbated appeals to racial bias in a representation campaign as would be grounds for setting aside a representation
election. 19

Whether these remedies will be effective cannot be foretold. It is
important for now, however, to inquire whether the NLRB's assumption of responsibility in this area is justified. This paper is an
attempt to explore that question.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

At first blush the Board's actions appear to be unwarranted. The
NLRB sits to enforce the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the
13. See Maloney, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Employment and the Role
of the NLRB, 21 MD. L. REv. 219 (1961); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act
and Racial Discrimination,62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962).
14. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (Dec. 10, 1962); Hughes Tool Co., IR93-63, Racial Units Within Union Held Unlawful, 52 LAB. REL. REP. 247 (1963).
15. Sewell Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Dec. 20, 1962); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Aug. 9, 1962). But see Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No.
11 (Aug. 9, 1962).
16. Pioneer Bus Co., supranote 14.
17. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962); Hughes Tool Co.,
supra note 14. While Miranda did not involve a question of racial discrimination, its
prohibition of discrimination based on "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair" considerations
clearly covers it. See OFFIcE OF TIE GENEAL COUNSEL OF THE NLRB, SUMMARY
OF OPERATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 1962, at 113 (mimeo. 1963); Rothman, Four Areas
of the Developing Law: Resume and Rationale 6-26, Address to the Labor Law Section,
Wisconsin Bar Association, Release No. 908, Feb. 15, 1963.
18. Miranda Fuel Co., supranote 17.
19. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF TE NLRB, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 113-14.
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Wagner Act) ,20 and two major sets of amendments to it-the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act) ,21 and Title
VII 6f the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(the Landrum-Griffin Act). z2 None of these acts makes any reference
to an authority in the Board to remedy racial discrimination. Moreover, the legislative history of each indicates quite clearly that
Congress had no intention of dealing with this problem at all.
A. Wagner Act
During the Senate hearings on the Wagner Act, the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator Walsh of
Massachusetts, made several passing references to the problem. At one
point he noted:
And there has been, unfortunately, as I have observed it in years that have
passed, a philosophy among the employers in the textile industry, that by
mixing the racial groups, and employing people who did not speak the
23
same language, they would be in a position to combat organization.

Later, he stated:
I have found that where there is a good deal of trouble between the
employer and employees it is in that class to which I referred this morning,
where there has been an attempt to amalgamate the different racial groups
as employees and where there has not been a meeting of the minds among

the employees themselves. 24

Finally, during the testimony of an employee representative of a
company union, Senator Walsh made a brief inquiry regarding the
representation of Negro workers by the Union.2 5 But nothing else
was raised by him or by the other members of the Committee on this
subject.
A representative of the NAACP opposed the Wagner Act on the
grounds that "organized labor is hostile to colored people."26 He
would have been prepared to support it if it had included provisions
aimed at racial discrimination in organized plants.27 But it did not.
20. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
21. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
22. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. II, 1961). Hereinafter the
NLRA and its amendments will be collectively referred to as "the act."
23. 1 NLRB, LEGIsLATrVE HIsToRY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs

at 310 (1935).
24. Id. at 317.
25. Id. at 919.
26. Id. at 1035.
27. Id. at 1035-36.

AcT 1935,
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A representative of the National Urban League similarly opposed
the act, saying:
[It] permits labor organizations to exclude Negroes from membership in
their bodies and from employment in occupations under their jurisdiction
* . .

denies to Negro workers the status of "employees" when they are

engaged as strike-breakers in occupational fields where they are prohibited
from joining the striking union . . . fails to protect the Negro worker from
practices of racial discrimination by labor unions, both as union and nonunion workers, [and] . . . permits the establishment of competitive unions
on the basis of race, thereby weaking [sic] the bargaining power of all
workers.28

A representative of the Daily Worker opposed the entire act but

suggested several alternative proposals, one of which would have
banned discrimination by employers against Negro workers.2
The arguments of a representative of the Manufacturing Chemists
Association on another point give some indication of the temper of
the times. He said:
[M]any of our southern plants employ a large number of colored workers.
In some cases such workers are in the majority. It is not difficult to foresee
the possible consequences of any attempt to apply and enforce the majority
rule provisions of the Wagner bill at plants where such conditions prevail.3 0

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America recommended that the act open up labor unions to all "competent workers
without distinction of nationality or race."3 1
There was nothing in the debates in Congress on the problem.
B. Taft-Hartley Act

The record here is shorter but no less conclusive that Congress
intended to keep hands off the race question in labor legislation. At
one point in the House debates Congressman Marcantonio said:
This bill has been hailed by its proponents as a new bill of rights for the
working people of this country. In view of the Republican claim in the
last election with respect to discrimination in employment and its pledges
for the enactment of fair employment practice controls, I now inquire of
the Chairman [of the House Committee on Education and Labor (Fred A.
Hartley, Jr.)] if he will accept an amendment incorporating the principles
28. Id. at 1058-59.
29. 2 NLRB, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1966-69.

30. Id. at 2083.
31. Id. at 2413.
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of fair employment practices to be added to the so-called bill of rights
that the gentleman proclaims his bill to be. 2

Congressman Hartley answered:
I will say to the gentleman that as far as that issue is concerned, I am

opposed to injecting that argument into this bill.m
During the hearings before the House Committee, the American
Civil Liberties Union proposed a bill which, among other things,
made it an unfair labor practice for a labor union
to refuse membership to, or to expel, or segregate any person by reason
of such person's race, creed, color, sex, national origin, foreign
nationality
34

or lack thereof, opinion, or lack of United States citizenship.

Nothing like this was enacted.
C. Landrum-Griffin Act
In the House debates Congressman Powell introduced an amendment to Title I of the LMRDA, a title not within the enforcement
jurisdiction of the NLRB, providing:
[N]o labor organization shall discriminate unfairly in its representation of
all employees in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreement [sic], or refuse membership, segregate or expel any person on the
grounds of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.3

Both Congressman Landrum and Senator Griffin opposed the amendment.36 It was defeated by a teller vote of 215-160.
There was nothing in the debates on Title VII of the act, the
amendments to the NLRA, relating to the problem.
III. THE COMPULSIONS ON

m NLRB To AcT

If this legislative history were all, the Board's assumption of jurisdiction in this area would clearly seem to be improper. But it is not
all. The Board is obliged to follow three important doctrines which
compel it to play a role here whatever the congressional history may
32. 1 NLRB,
706-07 (1949).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

AcT

33. Id. at 707.

34. 2 NLRB, op. cit. supra note 32, at 3635.
35. 2 NLRB, LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
DIScLosuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1648 (1959).
36. Id. at 1649.

LABOR-MANAGEIENT

REPORTING AND
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be. These doctrines may be called: the doctrine of neutrality; the
Shelley doctrine; and the doctrine of fair representation.
A. Doctrineof Neutrality
It is clear that the Board cannot avoid remedying discrimination
or appeals to bias in situations where it must act to protect other
rights established by the act. At the very least the Board must be
neutral with respect to racial questions. Take, for example, a case
where an employer threatens to replace white employees with Negroes
if a union wins a representation election. This is a classic threat of
job loss which is plainly a violation of the act.3 7 The fact that the
employer couched his threat in terms that would appeal to racial
bias does not make it any less a violation.
B. Shelley Doctrine
It is also clear that the Board, as an agency of the United States,
may not in the course of protecting rights created by the act enforce
racial discrimination. This much at least can be derived from the
Supreme Court's ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer.3
Shelley held that by virtue of the fourteenth amendment a state
court could not enforce a restrictive covenant based on color. Although Shelley was primarily based on the equal protection clause,
it would certainly apply to federal courts and federal agencies through
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 39
Shelley is significant for two reasons. First, it held that the state
acting through its courts could not enforce discrimination that was
clearly private in origin, thus in itself beyond the strictures of the
fourteenth amendment. Second, it held that the state could not do
this even in the course of enforcing general private rights (the right
to contract and the right to dispose of property) not created for the
purpose of establishing racial discrimination.
It is dangerous to generalize too far on the basis of Shelley. It did
not hold that restrictive covenants are state action and thus proscribed
by the fourteenth amendment. 40 It is not, therefore, a useful guide
for those cases where private discrimination is sought to be proscribed
merely because the agency discriminating may be shown to be an
37. See Boyce Machinery Corp., N.L.R.B. Case No. 15-CA-2061, IR-462-62 (mimeo.
1962), adopted on this point, 141 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (March 26, 1963). Cf. Associated
Grocers, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961).
38. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
39. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24

(1948).

40. See, e.g., Gast v. Gorek, 211 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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agency of the state.41 Shelley simply means that the state cannot
compel discrimination in certain areas.
Similarly, broader proscriptions than Shelley are violated where
the assertion of state power is disguised in the form of the protection
of general private rights.42
Moreover, even in those areas where Shelley is relevant, its application must have limits. There is little doubt, for example, that a state

can enforce its general trespass laws to exclude uninvited guests from
a private parlor even if invitations are based on racial considerations.

Setting these limits is not easy. It involves delicate accommodations
-in the extreme case a balance of the right of individual privacy

against the right to equal treatment. But as the individual right as-

serted against equal treatment becomes a right to be intolerant
within a broader area than home or family, the inability of the state

to compel such intolerance becomes clearer. 43

To say that Shelley involves difficult problems of application is not
to say that it is meaningless.44 Although it is never easy to spot the

precise moment when day ends and night begins, one knows the
difference between day and night. To take a closely related problem:
there may be some difficulty in determining when the right of privacy

appurtenant to residential property should bend to the assertion of
first amendment rights;45 but, there is considerably less difficulty in
determining that rights appurtenant to commercial property of a
public nature should bend to the assertion of such rights. 6 Similarly,
while there may be some difficulty in determining whether a testa-

mentary disposition that violates the constitutional principle of equal
treatment is judicially enforceable, 47 there can be no doubt that a
41. See Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). Cf. Oliphant v.
Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935
(1959); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action,"
70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961).
42. See Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). Cf.
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
43. The problem was argued in this form to the Supreme Court by counsel for the
plaintiff in Griffin v. Maryland, Docket No. 26. 31 U.S.L. WMXm 3160 (1962). This
case has been scheduled by the Court for reargument. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3385 (1963).
44. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Huv.
L. REv. 1, 31 (1959).
45. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Commonwealth v. Richardson,
313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585
(7th Cir. 1961). Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Watchtower
Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433
(1948); Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369, appeal dismissed, 335
U.S. 875 (1948).
46. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 50 L.R.R.M. 2160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1962). Compare
People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
47. See In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 570 (1958); Mills v. Philadelphia, 52 N.J. Super. 52, 144 A.2d
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court may not enforce a provision of a collective bargaining agreement which requires discrimination against Negroes. 48
Justice Douglas' statement of this principle is unexceptionable:
A union enters into a collective-bargaining agreement with an employer
that allows any employee who is a Republican to be discharged for "just
cause." Employers can, of course, hire whom they choose, arranging for an
all-Democratic labor force if they desire. But the courts may not be implicated in such a discriminatory scheme. Once the courts put their imprimatur on such a contract, government, speaking through the judicial
branch, acts. 49
0 is not to the contrary.
Hughes v. Superior Court"
There the
Supreme Court allowed a state injunction barring picketing to compel
employment of Negroes in proportion to the number of white customers, a practice considered to be inverse racism by the state court.5 1
The Supreme Court, however, was careful to point out that the state
52
would not enjoin picketing to prevent discriminatory hiring.

More recently the issue arose in the Court of Claims in Allen v.
United States.0 Negro railroad employees sued the United States for
salaries they would have earned if discriminatory job classifications
had not been in force during a period when the railroad in question
was in trusteeship under the supervision of a United States district
court. The government's motion for summary judgment was granted.
The court gave three reasons: (1) before the trusteeship the plaintiffs could have sued the railroad under the doctrine of fair represen-

tation (discussed below); (2) during the trusteeship they could have
applied to the judicial trustee for relief under that doctrine; and (3)

Shelley was not applicable because the "United States did not, through
its judicial branch, enforce a discriminatory practice against the
728 (Ch. Div. 1958).
48. See NLRB v. Pacific Am. Shipowners Ass'n, 218 F.2d 913, 917 n.3 (9th Cir.
1955); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777 n.3 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956), permitting enforcement
of a collective bargaining agreement discriminating against Communists, is not to the
contrary. The government may single out Communists for special regulation. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961). See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963), where Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court, refers to cases dealing
with legislative investigation of communism in the following language: "It is apparent
that the necessary preponderating governmental interest and, in fact, the very result
in those cases was founded on the holding that the Communist Party is not an ordinary
or legitimate political party, as known in this country, and that, because of its
particular nature, membership therein is itself a permissible subject of regulation and
legislative scrutiny." Id. at 547. (Footnotes omitted.)
49. Black v. Cutter Labs., supranote 48, at 302 (dissenting opinion).
50. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
51. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198 P.2d 885, 889 (1948).
52. 339 U.S. at 466.
53. 173 F. Supp. 358 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882 (1959).
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plaintiffs."M The clear implication was that Shelley would apply if
the United States did enforce a discriminatory practice against the
plaintiffs. The court said:
The [Shelley] doctrine .. .is that the States and the Federal Government,

through their judicial branches, will not become particeps to a racial discrimination, by judicially enforcing a discriminatory agreement between
private persons.55

United TransportService Employees v. National Mediation Board0
adds another twist to the problem. There the plaintiffs attempted to
set aside a craft determination by the Mediation Board relegating
Negroes to a unit represented by a union that denied them membership. The court dismissed the action but took pains to say:
While the action of the Board in its craft . . . determination may be
treated as governmental action . . . such determination . . . could have

no effect to 5 alter
the collective bargaining arrangements of the in7

dividual

plaintiffs.

Translated, this means that as long as the plaintiffs could require the
bargaining agent to deal with them fairly under the doctrine of fair
representation, the action of the Board did not violate the Shelley
principle.
United Transport raises the perplexing question whether Shelley
must be applied one step back. That is, if a union consistently enforced a discriminatory practice in its capacity as bargaining agent,
must the NLRB under Shelley withhold from the union its certificationm which is its government-given warrant to act?59 Going back
still one step further, must the NLRB under Shelley withhold certification from a union which has discriminatory membership policies?
In some situations a local's very existence is posited on its certification
as bargaining representative for the employees of a particular employer. In virtually every situation discriminatory membership policies
tend to promote the existence of discriminatory practices.
Whatever the answer to these questions, it is clear that the Shelley
54. 173 F. Supp. at 360.
55. Ibid.
56. 179 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
57. 179 F.2d at 453.
58. See Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Shapiro, 9
N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
59. Although a union may legally be recognized as bargaining representative even
without a certification if it represents a majority of the employees, cf. International
Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (certification enhances its
position). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B), (C) and (D); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3);
29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1958); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v.
Porter County Co-op, 314 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1963).
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principle must be taken into account in evaluating the actions of the
Board in the area of racial discrimination.
C. Doctrine of Fair Representation
There is one further principle which must be recognized in any
such evaluation: the principle of fair representation. This doctrine
has roots in the common law as well as in the public policy expressed
by the Taft-Hartley Act 60 and more recently by Titles I-VI of
Landrum-Griffin. Its core principle is that a certified bargaining agent
may not enter into a collective bargaining contract which discriminates
unreasonably against any group or individual.61 It has recently been
62
held to bar the discriminatory administration of a contract as well.

While the outer limits of the doctrine may be fuzzy, it is nonetheless
clear that racial discrimination is considered unreasonable and is,
therefore, subtended by it.63
On the face of it, the existence of the fair representation doctrine
would seem to dispose of the need for further concern in this area.
Fair representation is, however, fatally defective in at least two
respects. First, much racial discrimination is accomplished by
-discriminating on the basis of seniority or training, areas in which
Negroes because of past discrimination do not rank high. This is
extremely difficult to attack because of the wide range of reasonable
discriminatory determinations the bargaining agent is permitted to
make. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,6 referring to the doctrine of
fair representation, the Supreme Court said:
A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete
65
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.

In a recent run of cases the courts have denied relief for alleged

xacial discrimination largely on this ground.6 6 The second defect of
60. Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 V]LL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
61. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil Workers,
.350 U.S. 892, reversing per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). It may also apply
-to groups outside the certification unit if they are barred from it because of race.
-Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
62. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
63. Cox, supra note 60, at 167.
64. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
65. 345 U.S. at 338. See Administrative Ruling of NLRB General Counsel, Case
No. SR-2073, 51 L.R.R.M. 1026 (July 19, 1962).
66. Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); Washington v. Central of Ga. Ry., 174 F.
Supp. 33 (M.D. Ga. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Marshall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 268 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960); Marshall v. Central of Ga.
Ry., 147 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. Ga. 1956). But see Mitchell v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 91
F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ala 1950), modified, 190 F.2d 308 (1951).
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the fair representation doctrine is that this avenue is too risky an
expense for any individual worker. As noted, discrimination may be
hard to prove. In addition, until recently, the only forums for individual relief under this doctrine were federal or state courts, where
costs of litigation are usually prohibitive. There a worker does not
have available to him gratis, as he might have in an unfair labor
practice case,67 the investigatory and trial facilities of a government
agency.
Going beyond theory, in a joint study completed fifteen years after
the doctrine of fair representation was born, the New York State
Commission Against Discrimination and the New Jersey Division
Against Discrimination concluded that, despite some gains "the
historic assignment of Negro workers to menial tasks in the railroad
industry [where fair representation had first been applied6] continues
to be a fact."6
IV. NLRB-FEPC?
Thus while it is clear that Congress never intended the NLRB to
be an FEPC, it is also clear that the NLRB must occasionally act
like one when the doctrines of neutrality, Shelley v. Kraemer, or fair
representation demand it. Does the Board's recently renewed interest
in the area of equal employment opportunity reflect a proper application of these conflicting considerations?
A. Decertification

The legitimacy and the efficacy of decertification are two distinct
questions. With regard to its efficacy the General Counsel of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund once said that it is a "technique of
dubious worth against discrimination." 70 Professor, now Solicitor
General, Archibald Cox has pointed out some of the reasons for this
as follows:
67. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
68. See cases cited in note 61 supra.
69. N.Y. STATE COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & N.J. Div.

ACAINSr DisCnIINATION, RAILROAD EmPLOYMiENT IN NLv YoRK AND Nmv JEasEY 19 (1957).

One other "negative" aspect of the doctrine of fair representation needs mentioning,
Without the doctrine, the imperative for creating an enforceable right to union membership would have been weighty, particularly since at the time the fair representation
cases were first decided the closed shop was legal. It is interesting in this connection
that Betts v. Easley, supra note 41, decided when the doctrine was still young and
when the closed shop was still legal, created a "right" to union membership. The
Oliphant case, supra note 41, decided in 1958, found no such right.
70. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMEIuCAN LAW 182 (1959).
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[Ilt would have no practical value in situations in which the incumbent
union had never been certified or was able to negotiate discriminatory or
oppressive contracts by virtue of the employer's cooperation or its own
economic power.71

Also, decertification is meaningless where discriminatory practices
existed before the union arrived on the scene, a common situation
in many southern plants.

On the other hand, the threat of decertification can be extremely
effective as a tool to convince employees that they have more to lose by
continuing discriminatory practices which favor them than by discontinuing such practices.72 To be an effective threat, however, a remedy

must be credible.

Since until recently decertification was often

threatened but never used, its efficacy was greatly impaired. The
Board had come close to using it only twice. In Hughes Tool Co.73 the

Board warned the incumbent union that if it did not cease its discriminatory bargaining practices its certification would be rescinded.

In Larus & Brother Co.74 the Board was about to rescind the incumbent's certification when the incumbent voluntarily relinquished it.

Only recently has a trial examiner of the Board actually utilized
decertification.75 This case involved the same local as in Hughes

Tool Co. and came some ten years after the original warning.
Passing the question of efficacy, is decertification legitimate? The
early Board cases threatening decertification based their dicta upon
the doctrine of fair representation. 6 In Pacific Maritime Association,T

for example, the Board said:
[T]he Board will police its certification of a statutory bargaining agent
to see to it that it represents equally all employees in the bargaining unit
71. Cox, supranote 60, at 175.
72. In the light of George Meaney's testimony that union discriminatory practices
derive from rank and file prejudice, Equal Employment Opportunity, Hearings Before
the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1006 (1962), this seems to be the ultimate rationale for the efficacy of decertification.
73. 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
74. 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
75. Hughes Tool Co., IR-93-63, Racial Units Within Union Held Unlawful, 52 LAB.
REL. REP. 247 (1963).
76. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 110 N.L.R.B. 1647, 1648 (1954); Andrews Indus., Inc.,
105 N.L.R.B. 946, 949 (1953); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 322 (1953); Coleman
Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 120, 122 (1952); Veneer Prods., Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 492, 494
(1949); Wichita Falls Foundry & Mach. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 458, 460 (1946); Larus
& Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1084-85 (1945); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 973 (1945); General Motors Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 427, 431 (1945); Southwesterr
Portland Cement Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219 (1945); Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
804, 806 (1944).
77. 110 N.L.R.B. 1647 (1954).
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regardless of race, color, or creed. Should the certified bargaining agent

fail to do so, the Board may revoke its certification.7 8

More recently the Board has given reason to believe that it may
use the Shelley rationale to justify the threat of decertification in the
future . 9 To the extent that certification by the Board may be said to
represent a continuing enforcement of discriminatory practices, the
Shelley rationale is applicable. In terms of Shelley, there is no relevant
difference between refusal to certify in the first instance and
rescission of an existing certification, any more than there would be
a relevant difference between not issuing a permanent equitable order
to enforce a restrictive convenant and revoking such an order. The
difficulty with the application of the Shelley rationale lies in a determination of whether certification is in fact an enforcement of
discrimination. Where a union engages in isolated discriminatory
practices or condones discriminatory practices instituted by an
employer, certification hardly seems to be an enforcement of racial
discrimination. A certification exists in the ordinary case to protect
and enforce many rights other than the union's "right" to discriminate.
Where, however, the discriminatory practice pervades the entire
relationship between the employer and the union and is negotiated
by the union-as is the case, for example, when there is a contractual
establishment of separate seniority lines for Negro and white employees-it seems inescapable that the Shelley doctrine ought to
apply.8
But in those cases where Shelley does not apply, decertification
based solely upon the doctrine of fair representation seems unjustified.
The act provides that the majority representatives "shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees." 8' When the Board
conducts an election it "shall certify the results thereof."82 There is no
discretion in the Board to grant or to deny certification to a majority
representative. It can be argued that this reading of the statute
obviates the Board's long standing practice of setting aside elections
where one side destroys the 'laboratory conditions" test,8 3 and that
here, as in that case, reasonable limitations must be imposed on the
78. Id. at 1648.
79. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 18, n.3 and accompanying text (Dec. 10,
1962).
80. The fact that unions may achieve bargaining rights without certification, see
note 59 supra, does not affect this. Whatever assistance that certification gives the
union in enforcing its bargaining rights is governmental assistance, thus implicating

Shelley.
81. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
added.)
82. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1958).
added.)
83. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).

(Emphasis
(Emphasis
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mandatory language of the statute. But the crux of the "laboratory
conditions" test is that an election which does not satisfy such conditions fails to represent the "uninhibited desires of the employees."8 4
To put it another way, such an election does not truly represent the
desires of a majority of the employees. But where a majority of
employees have expressed in a Board-conducted election their

"uninhibited desires" to be represented by a particular union, the
Board "shali" certify the union. There are instances where certification may be disregarded because the certified bargaining agent no
longer represents a valid majority. 5 But these are the exceptions
that prove the rule. Only an attack on the bargaining agent's
majority can affect its certification. Moreover, even in such cases
there is no authority in the Board to revoke the certification except
under the provisions of section 9(c) (1) (A) (ii) of the act,86 which
provide for an election to indicate the lack of majority standing of the
certified union.
Thus it seems fair to say that nothing short of constitutional limits,
like those of Shelley, can whittle down the mandatory language
regarding certification of a valid majority representative.
The legislative history of the act is clear that the majority representative's status as exclusive representative was to be unaffected by

its attitude or actions toward racial discrimination. The fair representation cases themselves were decided on the theory that since

minorities could not escape representation by a discriminatory
majority representative, the discriminatory practices had to be dealt

with directly.8 7 The doctrine was invented because there was thought
to be no other way to protect minority rights.

8

The very existence

84. Id. at 127.
85. See, e.g., NLRB v. Porter County Co-op, supra note 59. The certified union's
lack of majority standing may be raised by an employer's refusal to bargain or by
a petition filed by another union claiming itself to be the majority representative. The
kinds of showings that have to be made by the rival union or by the employer and the
times at which these showings may be made involve complex questions which are
beyond the scope of this paper. In any event, it is still true that the effects of a
prior certification are dissipated only upon a showing that the certified union is not
the majority representative.
86. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1958). This has been
said to be "the exclusive means by which decertification of a bargaining representative
Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 542,
might be accomplished ......
546 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 279 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1960). In another series of cases the
courts refused to permit the Board to withhold the benefits of the act from a
majority union which stood in violation of the provisions of old sections 9(f), (g) or
(h) of the act, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, §§ 9(f)-(h), 61
Stat. 145-46 (1947), the non-communist oath provisions, since repealed, 73 Stat. 525
(1959), except to the extent explicitly provided by the act. See UMW v. Arkansas Oak
Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453-(1958).
Cf. Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956).
87. See cases collected in notes 61 and 62 supra.
88. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). See also Brother-
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of this judicial remedy to force upon the bargaining agent its duty of
fair representation weakens the logic of a decertification remedy
89
even more.

Of course if Shelley demands decertification, and in the case of
pervasive discriminatory practices by the bargaining agent it would
seem to, the practical result would not be much different from that
reached if the Board's rationale for decertification 9° were sound.
Shelley might well demand decertification as a constitutional matter
even in cases where under the Board's rationale decertification would
be improper. Consider, for example, the situation where a local union
does not admit Negroes to membership. In Bethlehem-Alameda
Shipyard, Inc.91 the Board said:
We entertain grave doubt whether a union which discriminatorily denies
membership to employees on the basis of race may nevertheless bargain
as the exclusive representative in an appropriate unit composed in part of
members of the excluded race. 92

But this was keyed to the effect of such discrimination in a closed
shop, then legal. Its "grave doubt" was based on the fear that:
If such a representative should enter into a contract requiring membership
in the union as a condition of employment, the contract, if legal, might
have the effect of subjecting those in the excluded group, who are properly
part of the bargaining unit, to loss of employment solely on the basis of an
arbitrary and discriminatory denial to them of the privilege of union
membership. 93

After the closed shop had been barred by the Taft-Hartley Act,
the Board unequivocally deemed discriminatory admission practices
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952). Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), is not to the contrary; in that case decertification and
disestablishment, ordered because the bargaining agent was found to be a companydominated union, was required by National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) §
8(a)(2), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1958). While Steele and
Howard were decided under the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1926), 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-58 (1958), Syres v. Oil Workers, supra note 61, has applied them in the context of the National Labor Relations Act.
89. The Board may now also enforce this duty. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. No. 18 (Dec. 10, 1962). The fact that the Board wil disestablish company
dominated unions, even though it may also remedy their existence by a cease and
desist order, does not invalidate the point. Disestablishment is ordered because,
among other things, there is no other effective way to remedy the violation of
National Labor Relation Act § 8(a)(2), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2)
(1958), which is raised by the very existence of a company dominated union. See
Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948).
90. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
91. 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
92. Id. at 1016. (Footnotes omitted.) See also Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804
(1944).
93. 53 N.L.R.B. at 1016.
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insufficient to justify decertification. In Pacific Maritime Ass'rt 4 the

Board even refused to hear evidence of discriminatory admission

policies.9 5 Following the fair representation rationale this conclusion
is inescapable. Discrimination in terms of employment must be shown.
But the distinction between discrimination in employment and discrimination in union membership makes very little sense under a constitutional rationale. Any time a government agency compels
discrimination it must be judged in terms of Shelley. For example,
in many cases a local is created solely for the members of one shop.
In such a case if recognition is by virtue of certification, the certification is the very source of the local's existence and the government
becomes heavily implicated in the enforcement of any discriminatory
practices by it, including discriminatory membership practices.
The case of segregated locals also illustrates the difference between
the constitutional and the fair representation approaches. The Board
has held, under the fair representation doctrine, that the existence of
segregated locals per se was not grounds for decertification.96 It
would only be such where the existence of the locals was a tool to
promote discriminatory job practices. 97 Yet ff one were to apply the
Shelley approach, the certification of segregated locals to bargain
jointly for one unit, even in the absence of a showing of job discrimination, would hardly seem in keeping with recent decisions arising
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 98
B. Removal of Contract Bar
In order to stabilize industrial relations, the Board has erected an
additional protection, not specifically created by the act, for the
bargaining agent; this is the doctrine known as "contract bar." This
doctrine holds that once a collective bargaining agreement has been
signed with the incumbent union another union cannot petition to
94. Supra note 76.
95. In this connection the effect of the first proviso to paragraph 8(b) (1)

of the

Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1958), cannot be overlooked: "[T]his paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein."
96. Larus & Bro. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1083 (1945).

97. ibid.
98. See note 79 supra.
problem of discrimination.
opportunities when their
primarily in mind than it

Holding segregated locals illegal may cut both ways on the
For example, it might be easier for Negroes to obtain equal
bargaining representative is Negro and has their interests
would be when the bargaining representative speaks for a

majority of white employees. The Negro complainants in Andrews Indus., Inc., supra note
76, realized this. Their complaint was that they were to be included in a unit
dominated by the majority of white employees. The Board refused to set aside a
certification based on this unit but promised to do so if it were later shown that the
representatives were not living up to their duty of fair representation.
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represent the employees until the expiration of a reasonable time,
now held to be three years. 99
Under classic theory, the Board has not permitted a contract to
be a bar where it was based on an inappropriate unit.100 Since race
is obviously not an appropriate consideration for unit determination, 10 1
a contract based on a unit so determined cannot be a bar.102 This
follows quite legitimately from the doctrine of neutrality previously
discussed. But can a contract be removed as a bar solely because the
union has violated its duty of fair representation? The Board seems
to have assumed from the outset that the answer would be yes, 0 3
but it has never so held despite the fact that the statutory argument
against such a holding is weaker than that against decertification.
What the Board in its discretion has given, the Board under reasonable
rules may be able to take away. In one of its recent decisions,'04 however, a discriminatory contract was removed as a bar on constitutional
grounds and not under the fair representation doctrine. The Board
said:
Consistent with clear court decisions in other contexts which condemn
governmental sanctioning of racially separate groupings as inherently discriminatory, the Board will not permit its contract bar rules to be utilized
to shield contracts such as those here involved from the challenge of
otherwise appropriate election petitions. 105

Why the Board felt obliged to refer to constitutional cases rather
than to the duty of fair representation as it has in decertification
cases is not clear. The Shelley rationale is not substantially more
persuasive here than it is in the case of decertification. A certification
absolutely blocks a new election for a period of one year from its
date and effectively blocks one for an even longer period. 106 The
contract bar rule blocks a new election for a period of three years
from the signing of the contract. 10 7 Perhaps this is an indication that
99. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Nov. 19, 1962).
100. See, e.g., American Bldg. Maintenance Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 185 (1960).
101. U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943); Tampa, Fla. Brewery, Inc., 42
N.L.R.B. 642 (1942); Southern Wood Preserving Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 25 (1941); Aetna
Iron & Steel Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 136 (1941); Georgia Power Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 692 (1941);
Crescent Bed Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 34 (1941); Floyd A. Fridell, 11 N.L.R.B. 249 (1939);
Union Envelope Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1147 (1939); American Tobacco Co., 9 N.L.R.B.
579 (1938). But see NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938).
102. Columbian Iron Works, 52 N.L.R.B. 370 (1943); Crescent Bed Co., supra
note 101.
103. Chesapeake-Camp Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 1784 (1944).
104. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (Dec. 10, 1962).
105. Ibid.
106. See authorities collected in note 59 supra.
107. General Cable Corp., supranote 99.
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the Board will turn to a constitutional rationale in its decertification
cases as well.
C. Setting Elections Aside
The third remedy, derived from early precedent and newly
sharpened by the NLRB, is the setting aside of representation elections if either side has made an exacerbated appeal to racial
prejudice. Thus the Board in Sewell Manufacturing Co.1'8 said, "The

Board does not intend to tolerate as 'electoral propaganda' appeals or
arguments which can have no purpose except to inflame the racial
feelings of voters in the election." 1 9 So saying, the Board set aside
an election in which a Georgia employer located in a small rural town
had engaged in a far-from-subtle campaign to buy votes by appealing
to racial prejudice. Before the election, wide use was made of the
fundamentalist-segregationist publication, Militant Truth, which
carried such measured comments as:
TOP UNION

LEADERSHIP

has

consistently

followed

the

socialist-

communist propaganda line, actively promoting every red, radical, leftist,
social, economic and political scheme from racial integration to unlimited
public squandering.

Among other things, a picture of the IUE's James Carey dancing
with a Negro woman was distributed to employees. Support by labor
for the NAACP was heavily played up. Copies of the Daily Worker
giving front page coverage to Martin Luther King and the Albany
Movement were circulated. The Board pointed out that all of this
was done "to exacerbate racial prejudice and to create an emotional
atmosphere of hostility to the Petitioner."" 0 It "so inflamed and
tainted the atmosphere in which the election was held," said the
Board, "that a reasoned basis for choosing or rejecting a bargaining
representative was an impossibility.""'
Despite the fact that Sewell involved propaganda which was
almost entirely of racial content, the decision is a good example of the
doctrine of neutrality. Although Sewell must affect to some extent
the amount of overt aid to civil rights causes which unions organizing
in the South may safely give, including the elimination of discriminatory practices in employment situations they control, its primary
effect is to insure rights of self-organization rather than rights to
equal employment opportunity. The problem at which Sewell struck
108.
109.
110.
111.

138 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Aug. 9, 1962).
Ibid.
Ibid.
ibid.
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was summarized as follows in the recent report of the Pucinski Com-

mittee: 12 "[U]nfortunately there is a widespread use of 'race hate'
material against union organization drives when the unions are on
record as ending compelled segregation." 3
Moreover, the Board's opinion, instead of emphasizing the peculiar
evil of such appeals to racial prejudice and the inhibiting effect they
have on assertive civil rights activities by labor, appealed to neutral
principles which have been applied by the Board in a number of
situations stemming from a decision handed down after the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act. In General Shoe Corp.,"4 decided in 1948,

the Board laid down the following rule for representation proceedings:
Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice
will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct
may not constitute an unfair labor practice." 5
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory
in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees ....
When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our
fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present
and the experiment must be conducted over again." 6

In Sewell the Board made it clear that it was this rule, and this
rule only, that was being applied:
[T]he Board . . . oversees the propaganda activities of the participants in
the election to insure that the voters have the opportunity of exercising a
reasoned, untrammeled choice for or against labor organizations seeking
representation rights. The Board has said in election proceedings it seeks
"to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires
of the employees." Where for any reason the standard falls too low the
Board will set aside the election and direct a new one ....
Our function . . . is to conduct elections in which the employees have

the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an
atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise,
free not only from interference, restraint or coercion violative of the Act, but
n7
also from other elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice.

Although the General Shoe standard may have been relaxed somewhat-"the rare extreme case" is transformed into "[when] for any
112. STAFF OF HousE SuBrcomm.
AD mSTRATrON OF =m LMRA By

ON NLRB, 87TH CONG., 1ST SEss.,
Tm NLRB (Comm. Print 1961).

REPOx T ON

113. Id. at 53. For the view that this is a neutral factor in southern organizing see

Marshall, Union Racial Problemsin the South, 1
114. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).

INDUSTmL RIMATIONS 117

115. Id. at 126.
116. Id. at 127.

117. 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Aug. 9, 1962).

(Footnotes omitted.)

(May 1962).
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reason the standard falls too low"-the standard applied is still a
generalized one which is applicable to all cases, not merely those
involving appeals to racial prejudice. By taking this "neutral' approach to racial appeals there may be some doubt as to whether
Sewell effectively meets the dilemma of southern organizing as posed
by the Pucinski Committee. 118 On the same day Sewell was handed
down the Board decided Allen-Morrison Sign Co.,119 in which it
refused to set aside an election despite an obvious appeal to racial
prejudice. The Board said:
The Employer's ... letter was temperate in tone and advised the employees

as to certain facts concerning union expenditures to help eliminate segregation. The excerpt from Militant Truth concerned [civil rights] action
taken by the Union . . . in a nearby city. We are not able to say that the
employer in this case resorted to inflammatory propaganda on matters in no
way related to the choice before the voters, and we therefore decline to set
the election aside.' 2 0

In addition, in Sewell itself the Board quite clearly indicated that
it was not departing from prior precedent upholding elections where
12 1
the appeal to racial prejudice was not as exacerbated as it was there.
What was this prior precedent?
In Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc.,'m the employer distributed before
the election letters describing the petitioning union's antidiscrimination policies. The Board said:
The issue before us is a narrow one. The Petitioner concedes that there
were no threats or promises, and it is not suggested that the Employer misrepresented the Petitioner's position. We are asked, rather, to hold that the
mere mention of the racial issue, in an election campaign, is per se improper and grounds for setting aside any and all elections where such might
occur.
We have not, in the past, attempted so to limit campaigning, but have
relied on the good sense of the voters to evaluate the statements of the
parties. We are satisfied that this is the better course, and adhere to it
in this case.=

In Mead-Atlanta Paper Co.u 4 the employer made statements to his

Negro employees that in some organized plants there was a lower
proportion of Negro to white workers than in his plant. This inverse

racism was held not enough to invalidate the election.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Note 113 supra and accompanying text
138 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Aug. 9, 1962).
Ibid.
Sewell Mfg. Co., supra note 108.
120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958).
Id. at 751.
120 N.L.R.B. 832 (1958).
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In Chock Full O'Nuts- 5
the Regional Director found... that the evidence established that Robinson
[a Negro supervisor], from the early Spring of 1957 until within a few
days of the election, frequently stated to Negro employees that "he was
the reason for the Union," that "some of the employees didn't want to be
represented by me because of my race," and that the "white employees
were jealous of my position with the Company."u 26

On the basis of Sharnaythe election was sustained.
In PaulaShoe Co.1'
the Employer objected to a statement at the bottom of the Petitioner's
handbill.. . "If you want to avoid that the Jew Sandier continue to mistreat you, vote for UTM," as designed to incite racial and religious prejudice against its plant manager and thus impair a free choice by the employees in the election .... The Board has previously indicated that while
it does not condone appeals to prejudice, the mere mention 128
of a racial or
religious issue is not grounds for setting aside an election.

In Kay ManufacturingCorp.'s
immediately before the election an International Representative of the
Petitioner during a visit to the home of an employee to discuss the merits
of unionization, stated that he had been told by the plant manager that
"Negroes in the South were too afraid of their jobs and that the white
trash was too stupid to vote for the union."1 30

The results of the election were certified.
If this were all, the Board's standard in this area would be fairly
clear. Anything short of the massive kind of campaign on the race
issue waged in Sewell would not be held to disturb the laboratory
conditions requisite to a fair election. But, following this standard,
little sense can be made of another recent case in this area, Heintz
Division, Kelsey-Hayes Co.' 31 A close analysis of that case reveals

quite clearly that the Board is concerned about more than the maintenance of laboratory conditions when the racial issue is raised. In
Heintz there were two petitioning unions, an unaffiliated local and
a UAW-CIO local. During the campaign the unaffiliated local hired
three white men and five Negroes to distribute handbills which read,
simply, "Vote UAW-CIO-July 14, 1959." The purpose was clear.
125. 120 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1958).
126. Id. at 1298.

127. 121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958).
128. Id. at 675-76.
129. 121 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1958).
130. Id. at 1078-79.
131. 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960).
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This was an attempt to dramatize the UAW's position on civil rights
and to use it to appeal to racial prejudice. The effect of the incident
was certainly no greater than the effect of the statements in the
Allen-Morrison case.lm3 No one argued that the UAW was not against
discrimination or segregation or that the handbills contained any
incorrect information. But the Board threw out the election. It said:
[n cases of fraud or trickery where the employees involved are deprived
of their ability to recognize propaganda for what it is and thus are deprived

for [sic] their ability to evaluate properly the propaganda, we have set
elections aside. In our opinion the campaign tactics here employed ... are
equally pernicious. Such deception, because of the many imponderables

involved in the selection of a bargaining representative, is fraught with the
possibility of misleading and misdirecting the interests and desires of voters
in many ways. . .. [T]o insure that our elections are conducted under
proper laboratory conditions, we hold that the failure of parties in Board

elections to identify themselves as sponsors of campaign 133
propaganda
initiated by them constitutes grounds for setting aside election.

How this case was more likely to disturb proper laboratory conditions
than Chock Full O'Nuts, Paula Shoe, Kay Manufacturing, or AllenMorrison is hard to understand.
In Heintz the Board relied on three cases for its holding that
"deception" justified setting aside this election: United Aircraft
Corp.,13 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.,135 and Chillicothe Paper
Co. 36 Not one of them was really apposite.
In United Aircraft a forged telegram was circulated which purported to be from the IAM, the union which lost the election, to the
UAW, the union winning it. The telegram lauded the UAW for its
efforts in expelling communists from its ranks and mentioned various
strikes in which the IAM had been engaged. In Sylvania a forged
letter was circulated which purported to be from the organizer for
the UE which insulted the men in the plant and which said that the
organizer bad to go "overboard" in his promises to them. In Chillicothe Paper a forged letter purporting to be from the petitioning
union was circulated. It said that if the union came in, the work
week would be reduced to give others work, that union assessments
would be based on a percentage of wages, that a notorious character
would represent the union in the area, and that the employees would
be trained for picket duty.
In each of these cases the deception was clear. In United Aircraft
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Allen-Morrison Sign Co., supranote 119.
Heintz Div., Kelsey-Hayes Co., supranote 131, at 153.
103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953), miscited by the Board in Heintz.
119 N.L.R.B. 824 (1957).
119 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1958).
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the laudatory remarks were false in the sense that they would not
have come from their purported maker, at least under these circumstances. There was also a deception in having it seem that such
remarks were purposely kept from the voters, since the voters were
receiving quite different information from the purported maker
concerning the UAvV. In Sylvania again the insulting remarks were
implicitly false, and the organizer's purported attempt to hide his true
feelings from the employees was also false. In Chillicothe Paper the
statements were explicitly false.
In Heintz there was nothing untrue about the UAW's implied
position on civil rights. Nor was there anything done to indicate
that the UAW was attempting to hide its position from the voters.
Negroes were distributing the leaflets openly. The facts here are
virtually indistinguishable from those in Allen-Morrison, except that
here the statement regarding the union's position on civil rights was
dramatized, but in a rather matter-of-fact way. Yet here the Board
set the election aside. Recognizing that this case was different from
United Aircraft, Sylvania, and Chillicothe Paper,the Board relied on
a theory that was neither needed nor used in those cases. The Board
in Heintz leaned heavily on the fact that the unaffiliated local had
failed to identify itself as the sponsor of the innocuous leaflet involved.
The Board said:
[T]o insure that our elections are conducted under proper laboratory conditions, we hold that the failure of parties in Board elections to identify
initiated by them conthemselves as sponsors of campaign propaganda
137
stitutes grounds for setting aside the election.
There are at least two reasons why the Board had to introduce
this extra factor, why it would not have been enough to say that when
votes are bought by a clear appeal to racial prejudice the Board ought
not enforce the results, a position which the Board in Heintz was
straining to reach. One is derived from the statutory scheme, dis-

cussed above, which severely circumscribes the Board's discretion in
election cases, absent a question concerning the valid majority standing of the winning union. The other is derived from the first amend-

ment to the Constitution which would seem to apply to governmental control of speech in this area.
The crowning irony of Heintz is that in seeking to escape the free
speech question by relying on the unaffiliated union's failure to
label its propaganda, the Board created an additional free speech
problem. Just a year before Heintz was decided, in Talley v.
California,1 the Supreme Court held that a local ordinance requiring
137. 126 N.L.R.B. at 153.
138. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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the source of a handbill to be printed on it was an infringement on
free speech. In Talley the Court did expressly refrain from passing on an ordinance directed at fraudulent handbills. But there was
nothing in the handbill in Heintz or in the circumstances in which
it was handed out, other than the lack of identification, protected by
Talley, that was fraudulent. Passing the transparency of the Board's
rationale in Heintz, what are the free speech limitations on the Board
in election cases?
To begin with, whatever limitations there may be are constitutional
rather than statutory; that is, section 8(c) of the act,'3 the so-called
free speech section, does not apply here. Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.

By its terms section 8(c) applies only to unfair labor practice cases.
In MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,140 the Board said:
Section 8(c) does not .

.

. prevent the Board from finding in a represen-

tation case that an expression of views, whether or not protected by Section
8(c), has, in fact, interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in an
election, so as to require that an election be set aside. 141

For a while it seemed that the Board might abandon the section
8(c) rule of Metropolitan;142 but the Board never said that it
would. Contrariwise, it has recently indicated that it intends to
adhere to it. In National Caterers, Inc., 4 3 the Board, in a footnote,
said:
We find no merit in the Employer's contention that such a finding [that
his action interfered with employee free choice in an election] is contrary
to the rights of free speech guaranteed employers in the Act. We have
held that the Act does not prevent the Board from holding in a representation case that expression of views, whether or not protected by Section 8(c),
can be a basis for upsetting an election. See Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company .... 144
139. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. II, 1960).
140. 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950), overruled on a different point-in National Furniture
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
141. 90 N.L.R.B. at 938.
142. E.g., Crown Drug Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 845 (1954); Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113
N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955).
143. 125 N.L.R.B. 110 (1959).
144. Id. at 113 n.4.
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Beside the fact that the words of section 8(c) themselves dictate this
result, it is also consistent with the section's legislative history.
Congress, in enacting section 8(c), was primarily interested in cases
in which the Board had used non-coercive speech as evidence of an
unfair labor practice. The House Conference Report on the act
explained:
The practice which the Board has had in the past of using speeches and

publications of employers concerning labor organizations and collective
bargaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how irrelevant or im-

material, that some later act of the employer had an illegal purpose gave
rise to the necessity for this change in the law. The purpose is to protect
the right of free speech when what the employer says or writes is not of a
threatening
nature or does not promise a prohibited favorable discrimina145
tion.

Typically, in an area where discretion had allegedly been abused,
Congress stepped in not to define the lines of discretion more sharply
but to eliminate it altogether.
An argument can be made that Congress used the words "unfair

labor practice" in section 8(c) to mean, generically, all remedies
under the act. If section 8(c) is no more than a restatement of the
first amendment this is a reasonable argument. The first amendment
is as concerned with indirect restraints on speech as with direct
restraints. 1' If, on the other hand, Congress had in mind something
other than the incorporation of the first amendment, one who takes
the position that section 8(c) applies to something more than unf-air
labor practices has very little on his side.
That Congress meant merely to incorporate the first amendment
into Taft-Hartley seems unlikely. An amendment proposed by Senator
McClellan to do just that 47 was eventually dropped, as had been a
similar proposed amendment to the Wagner Act. That Congress intended to give broader coverage than the first amendment provides
seems more tenable. To have merely enacted the first amendment

would have been unnecessary. As the House Report on the Wagner
Act said, commenting on a provision guaranteeing that "Nothing in
this Act shall abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press, as
guaranteed in the first amendment to the Constitution, " 48
[This] amendment [has] . . . no proper place in the bill. There is no reason
why the Congress should single out this provision of the Constitution for
145. 1 NLRB, LEciSLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr
549 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEGiSLATIV HISTORY].
146. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
147. 2 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, op. cit. supra note 145, at 1432-34.
148. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1935
at 3258 (1935).
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special affirmation. The amendment could not possibly have had any
legal effect, because it was merely a restatement of the first amendment to
the Constitution, which remains the law of the land irrespective of Congressional declaration.' 49

What then are the constitutional limits here? It is difficult to argue
that the first amendment has no application to representation proceedings;'-' the Board itself feels bound by it.'51 Clearly, if an employer
loses the fruits of victory in a representation case because of the
exercise of protected speech he is being deprived of substantial rights,
e.g., the right to be free from organizational or recognitional picketing
for a year;' s2 the right to be free from a representation proceeding for
a year;'53 and, if the union's loss is directly attributable to the protected speech, the right not to have to deal with the union. From any
realistic viewpoint he is being penalized for the exercise of free
speech. Representation proceedings, while not adversary, are an
important preliminary step in the application of a whole statutory
scheme. Insofar as the government may prejudice an individual
under that scheme, and prejudicial treatment will usually involve
considerable economic forfeit, it may only do so subject to the Bill
of Rights. The Supreme Court expressed this limitation as follows in
Speiser v. Randall,'m dealing with tax exemptions:
The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax
exemption is a "privilege" or "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech
..

.

. It has been said that Congress may not by withdrawal of mailing

privileges place limitations upon the freedom of speech which if directly
attempted would be unconstitutional. .

.

. This Court has similarly re-

jected the contention that speech was not abridged when the sole restraint
on its exercise was withdrawal of the opportunity to invoke the facilities of
the National Labor Relations Board . . . or the opportunity for public
employment . . . .So here, the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in
certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to
refrain from the proscribed speech.' 55

But to say that the first amendment is applicable here is obviously
not to say that any limitation on speech is proscript. Whatever meaning
the first amendment may have in relation to speech of a political
nature, when speech is used for purposes of economic warfare or for
149. Ibid.
150. See Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1962). But
see Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 887 (1954).
151. See Decorated Prods., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 131, n.3, 52 LRRM 1250 n.3
(1963).
152. 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (Supp. I, 1960).
153. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1958).
154. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
155. Id. at 518-19.
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economic solicitation-"commercial speech"-a balancing test has
always been applied. Even the most insistent advocate for an
absolutist test regarding political speech, Mr. Justice Black, has consistently adopted the balancing test where speech of this economic
nature is concerned. The philosophic and historic underpinnings for
this difference in approach are beyond the scope of this paper. It
will suffice to set forth some of the many examples of it.
In Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,56 the Court held that a nationwide publicity campaign between
the trucking industry and the railroad industry was protected by the
first amendment from the application of the Sherman Act because the
publicity was thought to be speech aimed at legislative action. But
Justice Black, writing for the court, said:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would

be justified.

57

In Martin v. Struthers5 8 the Court held that municipal regulation
of door-to-door religious solicitation was proscribed by the first amendment. In Breard v. Alexandria' 59 it held that such regulation of doorto-door commercial solicitation was not. In Lovell v. City of Griffin'60
broad protection was given the street distribution of religious leaflets.
In Valentine v. Chrestensen 6' regulation of street distribution of
advertising literature was permitted.
Commercial speech is not automatically beyond the pale. Where
its commercial aspects are outweighed by some general social purpose
served by the speech and its means of transmission is not socially
offensive 162 the balance will be struck in favor of the first amendment
claim: thus Noerr Motor Freight; thus the protection given to the
expressing by leaflet of grievances arising from rights given by Congress though arising in a commercial context; 6 3 thus the protection
given an appeal to exercise legal rights even though arising in a
156.
157.
158.
159.

365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id. at 144.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
341 U.S. 622 (1951).

160. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

161. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
162. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Wollam v. City of Palm
Springs, 379 P.2d 981, 52 L.R.R.M. 2688 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1963); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
163. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Although Valentine v.
Chrestensen, supra note 161, also involved a leaflet, the classic form of social protest,
see Talley v. California, supra note 138, the leaflet was found to be for commercial
purposes.
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commercial context.164 But such commercial speech-speech which
arises in a setting of economic warfare or economic solicitation-is
inspected more carefully than other speech, and if a legislature can
find in it a social harm, far short of the "clear and present danger" test,
the courts have permitted its regulation.
No better example of this approach, and none closer to the problem
at hand, can be found than in the regulation of peaceful picketing.
The Supreme Court has implied that picketing is not speech.165 But
this is judicial shorthand at best. Take the following case: the
NAACP sets up a picket on a public sidewalk in front of a store that
refuses to hire Negro employees; the sign reads simply, "Do Not
Patronize-This Store Does Not Hire Negroes." This picketing protests the labor policies of the employer; and it has long been the law
that such picketing, while aimed at racial discrimination, would be
considered a "labor dispute." 66 It is an attempt to exert economic
pressure to affect an employer's employment policies. Yet it seems
very likely that a regulation of such picketing would be struck down
as violating the first amendment. Here the social content of the
speech outweighs any harm there may be in the form of its transmission. 16 7 On the other hand, such picketing, because involving commercial consequences beyond its social appeal, not unlike those in
Noerr Motor Freight,would be scrutinized carefully by the Court. In
Edwards v. South Carolina168 the Supreme Court had little difficulty
striking down municipal regulation of a mass demonstration on a
much greater scale than a peaceful picket line which protested racial
discrimination. But, significantly, the demonstration in Edwards was
aimed not at a shop owner but took place on the State House grounds
of South Carolina; it thus did not come in a context of economic
warfare. The Court was careful not to cite a single case involving a
constitutional attack on picketing, although Justice Clark, dissenting,
did not indulge in the Court's implicit distinction in this regard. 169
Even Justice Black has succumbed to the Court's balancing test in
this area. In Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 70 he wrote the opinion
164. Talley v. California, supra note 138; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);

Compare American Fed'n of Labor v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
165. Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 162.
166. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, modified, 304 U.S.

542 (1938).
167. In Tinsley v. Richmond, 368 U.S. 18 (1961), involving a related situation,
the first amendment claim was not raised below and thus was not open for review.

See Tinsley v. City of Richmond, 202 Va. 707, 119 S.E.2d 488 (1961).

But see

Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1962).

The

picketing in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 162, was to enforce racial discrimination.
168. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

169. Id. at 241.
170. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 16

for the Court sustaining regulation of picketing in violation of a state
antitrust statute. In it he said, "[T]he Court [has been] . . . careful

to point out that it was within the province of states 'to set the limits
of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.""'1 And the
Court's approach to picketing has followed this line. While Thornhill
v. Alabama1 2 seemed to suggest that picketing is automatically protected by the first amendment or that its regulation must at least
overcome an initial presumption of validity, the Court has more
recently stated that there is a
broad field in which a state, in enforcing some public policy, whether of
its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its
courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing
effectuation of that policy. 173

Nor can the Court's approach here be considered sui generis as
simply relying on the peculiar effectiveness of picketing, as has some-

times been suggested, 174 although historic fears of picketing excesses
do seem to be weighed in the balance. More is involved. All speech
is a call to action.175 In certain respects the demonstration in Edwards
was just as "effective" as a picket line; and the leafletting campaign in
Schneider v. Town of Irvington16 was just as "effective" as the leafletting campaign in Valentine v. Chrestensen.'7
Similarly, employer speech in a representation election campaign
is in the first amendment ballpark; but because this speech is simply
a tool of economic warfare, "some public policy" 178 can limit it. The
question is-what policy?
A suggestion of an answer to this essential question has been given
in the cases coming up under the Board's fluctuating no-solicitation
rules. These rules, subject to various niceties and recent changes not
relevant here, have held that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to adopt an invalid no-solicitation rule, one that bars all
union solicitation on his premises, while at the same time using the
premises to speak against the union. To the extent the employer is
required to open his premises to union solicitation as a condition
precedent to speaking against the union, he is being penalized for his
171. Id. at 499. Compare Justice Black's dissent in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 259-62 (1961).
172. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
173. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 293 (1957).
174. Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 162, at 465.
175. "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is
acted on .
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
176. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
177. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
178. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, supra note 173.
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exercise of speech. 7 9 Yet the Supreme Court has not seen his right to
speak under these circumstances as absolute. In NLRB v. United
Steelworkers of America'm the Court held that the enforcement of a
no-solicitation rule was not an unfair labor practice primarily because
it had been stipulated that the rule involved was a valid one. It felt
obliged, however, to add the following dictum:
We do not at all imply that the enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule
by an employer who is at the same time engaging in anti-union solicitation
may not constitute an unfair labor practice. All we hold is that there must
be some basis, in the actualities of industrial relations, for such a holding.' 8 '
So the test of regulation of speech in this area becomes whether there
is some basis, "in the actualities of industrial relations," for such a
holding. And presumably the NLRB, the expert in this area, shall be
able to make conclusive determinations as to the existence of such
"actualities" as would require the regulation of speech.
In its brief in the Steelworkers case the NLRB had argued as follows in support of its holding below that noncoercive employer speech
coupled with a valid no-solicitation rule was not an unfair labor
practice:
The fact that an employer's views may, because of his economic position,
carry an impact far beyond its mere logic or persuasiveness is a consideration which is specifically foreclosed by Section 8(c) [in
an unfair labor
practice case] if not by the First Amendment itself.182
While the Court sustained the Board's ruling below as a matter of
statutory construction, the quoted argument of the Board's brief was
implicitly rejected in the Court's dictum set forth above. Revealingly,
this argument was explicitly rejected by Justices Black and Douglas
in their dissent 83 adopting the opinion of the court of appeals, which
did not even hint that the first amendment was relevant to its decision.184
If, then, employer speech, as a tool of economic warfare, may be
regulated subject to the "actualities of industrial relations," how do
we define these "actualities"?
Initially it seems settled that where such an appeal is an intimation
179. See Speiser v. Randall, supra note 154, at 518-19; NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 214 F.2d 78, 83 (6th Cir. 1954). But see Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d
640, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1952).
180. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
181. Id. at 364. (Emphasis added.)
182. Brief for NLRB, p. 31, NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S.
357 (1958).
183. 357 U.S. at 365.
184. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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of job loss to a white work force where the union is allegedly integrationist, or to a Negro work force where the union is allegedly segregationist, the speech is not protected. Why should this be so? As
discussed above, the Court has employed two criteria when evaluating first amendment claims relating to speech used as an economic
weapon. First, is the message directed at some broader purpose than
the immediate economic warfare involved? Second, is there any evil
which a legislature could reasonably find in such speech? Obviously
there are also other unarticulated assumptions at work. The ancestry
of any particular mode of speech may be one: thus the sometimes
illogical preference for distribution of leaflets over peaceful picketing,
though the effects may be identical; thus the preferred position for
books over motion pictures. It is hard to believe, for example, that
185
the prior restraint involved in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago
would have stood were book sellers rather than motion picture producers involved. More important, however, than the pull of history
on these decisions is the fact that speech can very rarely be stripped
down to a bare tool of economic warfare. Nor is it ever easy to
determine just how insubstantial the noneconomic crust around the
economic core of the speech must be before the propensity to harm
will render the speech vulnerable to regulation. But these difficulties
are minimal where the threat of job loss because of union membership
is involved. There the economic core of the speech stands naked.
There the harm, the frustration of a neatly drawn accommodation
standing at the heart of a fundamental adjustment in our economic
system, is clear.
But to say that threats make the easiest case is not to say they
constitute the only situation in which the "actualities of industrial relations" permit regulation of speech. Take, for example, that which
may be the hardest case: during a representation campaign the
employer distributes a leaflet stating "XYZ Union has a policy of
maintaining integrated locals. Do not join XYZ Union." What would
happen if these cases were transposed into a picketing situation? Is
the following really a different case? The White Citizens Council
pickets ABC Department Store with signs reading: "ABC maintains
nondiscriminatory hiring policies. Do not patronize." The free speech
claim is similar in both instances. In both, a racist appeal is being
used to secure an ultimate economic goal, although in the ABC case
there is even more than a job-seeking economic goal involved. The
fact that the first amendment claim in the ABC case would seem to
be foreclosed by Hughes v. Superior Court'86 gives some credence to
defining the "actualities" so as to permit regulation of employer
185. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
186. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).

1963]

NLRB-FEPC?

speech in the XYZ case. But this assumes that the picketing in
Hughes to enforce racist hiring policies can be matched with the form
of speech delivery in the XYZ case. In many ways
it can. As judge
187
Learned Hand said in NLRB v. Federbush Co.:
Language may serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays the
speaker's feelings and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree

clouded, if the hearer is in his power. Arguments by an employer directed
to his employees have such an ambivalent character; they are legitimate
enough as such, and pro tanto the privilege of "free speech" protects them;

but, so far as they also disclose his wishes, as they generally do, they have
a force independent of persuasion. The Board is vested with power to
measure these two factors against each other, a power whose exercise does
not trench upon the First Amendment. 188

Employer speech in a representation campaign is potentially as
menacing to its audience as is picketing to its and is, like picketing,
subject to severe abuses. In some ways the XYZ speech is more
harmful than picketing. The employer there is in a position unilaterally to establish racist conditions, something the Hughes-type
picket cannot do. The XYZ leaflet then begins to appear more like a
promise that if the XYZ union is rebuffed, the segregated condition
of the plant will remain as is. This promise raises a harm of constitutional dimensions which must be weighed against the free speech
claim. That is, the enforcement of the promise by recognizing the
election as valid and by certifying the results would seem to bring
the whole Shelley apparatus into play.
The reductio ad absurdum sometimes raised to this is the example
of an employer advising his Negro employees not to join a union
because it maintains segregationist policies. But put it another way.
Could the Congress ban picketing to protest racial discrimination?
As stated above, in this instance the social content of the speech outweighs any harm there may be in the form of its transmission.
Thus the way seems clear for a holding that as a constitutional
matter there is nothing to stop the NLRB from barring all appeals
to racial prejudice in an election campaign because all such appeals
imply a promise of discrimination if the union loses. This does not
mean that a sound administration of the act demands complete silencing of racial propaganda in an election campaign or even that such
control is justified under the act. But to the extent that such appeals to
racial prejudice cause representation elections to be determined by
anything less than the "uninhibited desires of the employees"' 89 re187. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
188. Id. at 957. Compare NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469

(1941).

189. General Shoe Corporation, 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
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garding union membership, regulation of them seems plainly proper,

if not compelled by Shelley. And thus the rule adopted by the Board
in Sewell Manufacturing Co.190 does not seem to cover all speech in
this area which may, as a constitutional matter, be regulated. By

insisting that the speech be "inflammatory"' 91 or that it "be exacer-

bated,"' 92 standards which may be sufficient with regard to truthful

information regarding the civil rights policies of the union involved,
the Board ignores other important types of appeals to racial prejudice.
What- if the appeal is untruthful? What if it is irrelevant, because
dealing with other unions? Indeed, what if the appeal is truthful and

germane and does not carry any threat or promise with respect to
economic conditions or jobs'93 but is simply a thinly veiled promise

to maintain segregated conditions? 194 In all three of these last-men-

tioned situations the Board seems free, as a constitutional matter, to
impose restrictions on the racial appeal involved. The right to be

informed means the right to be informed substantially accurately; it

means the right to be informed regarding the civil rights policies of

the union in question, not such policies of some other union. And
when the information is couched in such language or given under
such circumstances that its primary purpose is to promise the maintenance of segregated conditions, not only is the first amendment

claim minimal but also Shelley places a substantial constitutional

consideration in the balance in opposition to it. Board member Bean

put it this way, dissenting in Westinghouse Electric Corp.,19 with
respect to the last-mentioned type of racial appeal:

Did the employer [implicitly] promise the continuation of a discriminatory
advantage, or favored treatment to one class of employees over another in
return for votes against the Union? If it did, such conduct obviously
requires that the results of the election be set aside. 196

This simple, common sense rule takes into account more than the
190. 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Aug. 9, 1962).
191. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Aug. 9, 1962).
192. Sewell Manufacturing Co., supra note 190.

193. Associated Grocers, 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961).
194. Query if this is a promise with respect to working conditions. The NLRB does

not seem to have recognized as a legitimate working condition under the act an
employee's desire not to have to work in the company of Negroes. In an administrative
decision in 1951 the General Counsel of the NLRB is reported to have ruled as
follows: "Regional Director's refusal to issue complaint alleging discriminatory refusal to hire group of strikers is sustained since strike was for sole purpose of attempting to cause employer to discharge Negro employees because they were Negroes and
such concerted activity does not come within activity protected by § 7 of the NLRA."
Admin. Ruling of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. 56, 27 L.R.R.M. 1442 (1951).
See. also Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1948).
195. 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957).
196. Id. at 120-21.
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Board ever has, surely more than in Sewell, the "actualities" of a
representation campaign. In so doing it is unimpeachable in terms of
the first amendment. Also, no less a rule can be squared adequately
with the Board's generally applied "laboratory conditions" test.
D. Appeals to Racial Prejudice as an Unfair Labor Practice
With respect to such appeals the General Counsel of the NLRB has
recently made the following statement:
Because of the substantial importance of this problem in the administration

of law, the Office of the General Counsel would consider it necessary if
appropriate charges were filed in a given case involving appeals to racial
prejudice to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. This would permit a

Board determination whether in certain circumstances appeals to racial
prejudice do not merely interfere with free choice in an election but whether
such appeals may not also constitute an unfair labor practice against which
a remedial order should be obtained. 197

Unlike the remedy of setting aside elections, an unfair labor practice order is subject to the provisions of section 8(c) of the act, set
forth above. 98 A comparison of the cases in this area decided before
8(c) with those decided subsequent to its enactment indicates the
effect on the regulation of appeals to racial prejudice which the free
speech clause of the act has had.
1. Pre-8(c) Cases.-In PlantersManufacturingCo.199 the Board said,
We find that the [employer] .

.

. in attempting to arouse racial prejudice

between the white and colored employees for the purpose of causing some
to cease being members of the Union ... and in other ways, has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights

guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.2°0

In Arcade Sunshine Co.201 the Board held that a statement that
the union would not be friendly to Negroes constituted interference.
In California Cotton Oil Corp.202 the Board held that statements
that Negroes in the plant would not be treated as well by the union
as by management constituted interference.
In E. Bigelow Co.2 0 the company president said, "I have been told,

through reliable sources, that if the union goes into effect, that will
197. OFFICE OF T=E GENERAL CouNsEL OF m NLRB, SumnRvY OF OPERATIONS,
CALENDAR YEAR 1962 at 113-14 (Mimeo. 1963).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See text accompanying note 139 supra.
10 N.L.R.B. 735 (1938).
Id. at 753.
12 N.L.R.B. 259 (1939).
20 N.L.R.B. 540 (1940).
52 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
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be all of it for the niggers."2 4 This was held to constitute interference.
In S. K. Wellman Co. 20 5 the foreman said that "if the CIO got in the
plant, it would be fulla negroes."2 6 This was held by the trial
examiner to be evidence of interference and his findings were affirmed
by the Board.
In Reeves Rubber, Inc. 20 7 a statement by the company president
that if the plant were organized it would be "run by Negroes from
Los Angeles and Mexicans from San Juan Capistrano" was held by
the trial examiner to be evidence of interference. The Board affirmed
his findings.
2. Post-8(c) Cases.-In Bibb Manufacturing Co.21s the trial examiner
said:
Foreman Kite approached Mercer and asked him if he had joined the
Union. . . . [Mercer] answered that he was going to as soon as he bad a

dollar, whereupon Kite told him that he could join the Union if he wanted
to work with Negroes. This was another obvious attempt to raise the race
prejudice among white employees in order to discourage membership in
the Union by creating the economic threat that Negro employees would be

allowed to hold positions then reserved for white employees. The respondent acknowledged that it restricted its Negro employees to certain
menial tasks reserving the other jobs for white employees. The undersigned
finds that this economic threat constituted interference, restraint, and
coercion in violation of Section 8(1) of the Act.20 9
2 10

No exceptions were taken to his ruling.
In American Thread Co.211 the plant superintendent was reported to
have said that if the plant were organized "we would be working side
by side with Negroes and sharing the same rest room with them, and
. . . they wasn't for us."2 12 In analyzing this statement the trial
examiner, who was affirmed by the Board, said:
[These remarks] are not violative of the Act. Under the Act, mere words
ascribable to an employer do not constitute unlawful interference with the

legal rights of the employees unless the words amount to an actual threat
of economic punishment for engaging in collective activities, or, when

interpreted in the light of other proven facts, to an implied threat of the
same character; hence the discussion of facts and arguments, or the ex204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
53
Id.
60

at 1006.
N.L.R.B. 214 (1943).
at 222.
N.L.R.B. 366 (1945).

208. 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949), modified, 188 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1951).
209. Id. at 377.
210. Id. at 346.

211. 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).
212. Id. at 601.
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pression of opinions, preferences, or dislikes on the subject of labor relations, do not violate the Act.21 3
In Happ Brothers Co.2 14 a forelady said that "if the employees 'got
tied up with the C.I.O. and John L. Lewis, they'd work side-by-side
with Negroes.' . .. .[d]on't you know if you all get the Union up
here, you'll be setting up here by niggers' "?215 The trial examiner
said that the forelady by
asking employees whether they had gone to a union meeting or whether
union representatives had been to see them, in appealing to racial prejudice,
and in threatening them with loss of their jobs . . . interfered with, re-

strained, and coerced.., 216employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
to explain, the Board upset the
Without even deeming it necessary
21 7
trial examiner's report on this point.
In Model Mill Co.218 the employer
directed . . . a colored employee, to take his . . . chair behind his desk,

as an illustration of what the advent of the union might mean, remarking,
in effect: "How would you like someone to come into your home and tell
you how to run it"?219

The trial examiner, affirmed by the Board, said that this "conduct
is not found to constitute interference, restraint, or coercion, but is

considered as the exercise of protected free speech ....1o
More recently, in 1958, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued
a ruling declaring that under the following set of facts no unfair

labor practice complaint ought issue:
As part of its campaign to defeat the union, the company attacked the
union on racial grounds. Company officials issued statements to the effect
that the union was an advocate of racial integration not only in schools,
housing, and social relationships, but also on jobs, and that a union victory
would mean that Negroes would work alongside white employees in the
plant.22i
213. Id. at 601-02.
214. 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950), enforcement denied on another ground, 196 F.2d
195 (1952).
215. Id. at 1533.
216. Id. at 1533-34.
217. Id. at 1514.
218. 103 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1953).
219. Id. at 1534.
220. Id. at 1538.
221. Admin. Ruling of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. 723, 43 L.R.R.M. 1219
(1958).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In

[VOL. 16

Empire Manufacturing Co. 22 2 the trial examiner, who was

affirmed by the Board, said:
[Supervisor] Sowers stated that if the Union came in "They will do like
they do up North, they will hire Niggers and put them on all these machines
with you all." . . . Considering the locality of the plant [North Carolina],
I consider the statements should be accepted as a threat to impose more

onerous working conditions and a violation of Section 8(a) (1)

.

...

223

In Petroleum CarrierCorp.224 the trial examiner, who was affirmed
by the Board, found that an employee had been called into the office
of an assistant manager who had made a statement to him
suggesting a limitation of the workweek to 40 hours if the Union succeeded
in its campaign to be unlawful. Had this statement stood alone it and the
accompanying threat to hire anybody ["Nigger, cajun, %vop or whatnot"]
would have been covered by the shield of isolation, but it occurred in a
context of coercive and restraining interrogation. 225

He found the threat to hire anybody to be "a direct threat that the
employees would suffer enforced association with persons of sup-

posedly inferior origins if they accepted the Union and the falsity of
the premise does not negate the threat."226

Finally, in Associated Grocers, Inc.,227 the trial examiner, who was

affirmed by the Board, made the following finding:
On July 12 [three days before the election] the Company placed an ad
in the Port Arthur News help-wanted column advertising for white employees in the warehouse . . . approximately 100 applicants responded and
arrangements were made for them to fill out their forms at a table placed
out on the loading dock within sight of the employees. A large majority
of the warehouse and truckdriver employees are Negro ....
I find that the
Respondent interfered with and coerced employees by the July 12 advertisement; its specification of white help, unexplained, plainly would have the
natural effect of intimidating the existing Negro complement. 228
What is the pattern emerging from these post 8(c) cases? At the
outset a threat to impose loss of economic privilege was considered

outside the scope of 8(c)-thus Bibb Manufacturing Co.2-but a
threat that the Union would mean loss of non-economic segregated
222. 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958).
223. Id. at 1317.
224. 126 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1960).

225. Id. at 1038.
226. Id. at 1038-39.
227. 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961).
228. Id. at 473-74.
229. Note 208 supra.
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conditions was considered protected-thus American Thread Co.,

Happ Brothers Co.,z 3 1 and the 1958 Ruling of the NLRB General

Counsel.232 More recently, however, while a Bibb Manufacturing
threat is still unprotected, viz., Associated Grocers,Inc.,

3

a threat that

the union will mean non-economic desegregation is also unprotected,
not only where the employer threatens unilaterally to desegregate, as
in Petroleum Carrier Corp., 34 but also presumably where the threat
is that the union itself will cause such desegregation, as in Empire
Manufacturing Co.235

A rule like the one which can be derived from Empire is proper
where it is directed at setting an election aside. It accurately evaluates the "actualities" of the circumstances, thus escaping any first
amendment obstacle; and it properly defines the requirements for
meaningful 'laboratory conditions," thus coming within a neutral
rule applied by the Board in all cases, not only in those dealing with
appeals to racial prejudice. Is such a rule also proper here? Where
it is used to fashion an unfair labor practice, different considerations
are at work than in an election situation. Section 8(c) is explicit that
speech can be regulated as an unfair labor practice only where it contains a "threat of reprisal or force' or a "promise of benefit." Axe the
statements in Empire "threats" or "promises" in this sense? If the
threat or promise were with respect to job loss or other economic
discrimination, there would be no difficulty. Such threats or promises
are clearly exempted from section 8(c).236 But the threat or promise
here deals with working side by side with Negroes, not with economic
discrimination. If having to work in desegregated conditions is an
onerous working condition, a strike to protest desegregation ought to
be protected activity; but the Board does not seem to have considered
such protests as protected activity. 7 Either the question of desegregation on the job is a legitimate working condition or a promise or
threat with respect to it is not exempted from section 8(c); in terms
of a neutral application of the act, one cannot have it both ways.
It is, however, totally unrealistic to say that the question of
desegregation on the job does not deal with conditions of employment, relevant to employees; thus the position that protests concerning such conditions are not "concerted activities" within the meaning
of the act seems plainly wrong. This is not to say that the Board
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Note 211 supra.
Note 214 supra.
Note 221 supra.
Note 227 supra.
Note 224 supra.
Note 222 supra. See also Boyce Machinery Corp., supranote 37.
See note 145 supra & accompanying text.
See text of note 194 supra.
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will therefore be compelled to protect attempts to impose segregated
conditions. It seems doubtful that Shelley would permit such compulsion. What this means simply is that a statement with respect to
desegregation can be a promise or a threat within the meaning of
section 8(c).
A second difficulty with the Empire test is that the threat involved
is not a threat that the employer will do something but that the union
will bring certain conditions about. But here the employer is warning
that if the union demands desegregation he may throw up his hands
and in this fashion the desegregation which is said will follow unionization is traceable to actions within the employer's control.28 And
his degree of control is not eliminated by the fact that the question
of desegregation conditions may be a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining;239 the duty to bargain in the language of the act "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession." 240 He is implicated in any conditions which unioniza-

tion may bring because they cannot exist unless he agrees to them.
There is another approach to this aspect of Empire. Section 8(c)
exempts a "promise of benefit" from its terms. Here there is a promise
to maintain segregated conditions as long as the union stays out;
this is not simply a promise to maintain the status quo in all events.
To whatever extent the employer's continued degree of opposition to
desegregation is conditioned on the absence of a union, this is a
promise of benefit unshielded by section 8(c).241
This approach opens the door to what could be a very effective
remedial order. Proceeding on the promise theory underlying Empire
one remedy which suggests itself is an order that the employer cease
and desist from promising to maintain segregated conditions in the
event the union loses the election and that he post notices to the
effect that he will not continue segregated conditions if the union
238. See Boyce Machinery Corp., supra note 37. But see Southwester Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 805 (1955).
239. Since it concerns a condition of employment it would seem to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining. See Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied on this point, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). Compare the press release issued by
the NLRB General Counsel March 18, 1963, NLRB General Counsel Reports Issuance
of Unfair Labor Practice Complaint Based on Racial Discrimination in Job Conditions,
stating in part:
"Future litigation will undoubtedly be required to test not only the extent of a union's
obligation of fair representation to all employees in the bargaining unit, but also
whether the duties and responsibilities of an employer, where a collective bargaining
relationship exists, includes the obligation not to participate in or be a party to
provisions based upon discriminatory or disparate treatment of employees in the
bargaining unit, no matter how or by whom such contract provisions were initiated
or motivated."
240. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
241. Compare Southland Manufacturing Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 53, 55 (1952), with Northern Fruit Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1954).
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loses the election. One can hardly imagine the Board ordering an
employer to post notices saying that he will continue segregated
conditions in all events.
But either approach-threat or promise-can be the basis for another
effective remedy beyond the usual, and usually inadequate, cease
and desist order. Once a union has secured proper authorizations
from a majority of employees and the employer can be shown to
have no good faith doubt as to this majority, he must recognize the
union on demand. One indication of the employer's lack of good
faith doubt of union majority is his commission of unfair labor
practices aimed at undermining such majority.242 Thus a demand by
a majority union for recognition could effectively cut off any racial
appeals remediable as an unfair labor practice. The deterrent effect
of an order to bargain is much greater than the deterrent effect of
setting aside an election the employer has won in part because of
"inflammatory" appeals to racial bias.
But beyond this, an unfair labor practice cannot be particularly
effective here. Unless the Board is prepared to seek injunctive relief
to support its complaints-an avenue secured to it by the act 243 but
rarely used for employer violations-an unfair labor practice remedy,
except for the two just discussed, is largely meaningless. It orders
the employer to cease and desist from violating the law long after
the effects of his violation have been spent. Compared with the
remedy of setting aside an election 2 " such an order represents at best
a hollow victory not only for the union having to meet the racial
appeals, but also for the community at large, which presumably has
some interest in their deterrance.
E. Failure to Represent Fairly as an Unfair Labor Practice
In Miranda Fuel Co.,245 the Board ruled on two points. Its first
holding was that section 7 of the act protects employees in their
right to fair representation, and thus union activity which violates
this right is an unfair labor practice. Similarly, employer participation in such activity is also an unfair labor practice. Given the
Board's initial premise its conclusion cannot be denied. Section
8(b) (1) (A) 246 makes itan unfair labor practice for a union to impede
242. E.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1963).
243. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958).
244. The effectiveness of this remedy is also subject to some doubt. In the Sewell
situation itself the Board set aside two elections because of improper appeals to racial
bias. Each of them, as well as a third election, was lost by the union by virtually the
same vote. While the election slate was wiped clean, the Board's remedy could not
erase the effects of the appeal to racial bias.
245. 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962).
246. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1958).
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the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the act, and section
8(a) (1)247 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
impede the exercise of such rights. But what are the rights protected
by section 7? Section 7 provides, in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....

248

It is the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing" which the Board found in Miranda to subtend
the protected right to be represented fairly. As a matter of statutory
construction it is difficult to say that such a reading has no merit. If
there is a right to fair representation under the act, there is no
particular reason to assume that Congress intended the protection of this right to be solely by the courts. The original fair
representation cases arose in the courts because they were under the
Railway Labor Act, 249 which makes no provision for administrative
enforcement of its section 7-type provisions. Nor, since Miranda did
not involve racial discrimination, is the legislative history relevant
with respect to Negro rights under the act.
On the other hand, this holding of Miranda raises at least two
significant problems. First, will its effect be to remove enforcement
of fair representation rights under the act from the courts? There is
no other instance in which the courts have taken jurisdiction over
violations of the act not specifically granted by it to them. Granted,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may here be somewhat mechanistic in view of the courts' long involvement in this area and the Board's
johnny-come-lately assertion of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, dual jurisdiction here would be something of an anomaly. But if the courts
must bow to the Board's primary jurisdiction, the loss may be slight
from a "result oriented" point of view. Court actions have not proved
particularly effective in this area.2 ° Yet given the broad discretion
of the NLRB general counsel to issue or to refuse to issue complaints,
the gain in supplanting court actions by an administrative remedy
may well be questioned.
Another question raised by this holding of Miranda concerns just
how much will be read into the rights protected by section 7. Miranda
says that the right to be represented fairly is guaranteed by the right
to bargain collectively. The same logic would seem to demand that
247. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
248. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
249. See Note 88 supra. See also authorities collected in notes 60 & 61 supra.
250. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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the right to "form, join or assist labor organizations," also protected by
section 7, subsumes employee rights in such labor organizations, including perhaps rights created by Landrum-Griffin. Further, would
not section 7 protect violations of section 12 of the act, 2 l which makes
it illegal to interfere with any member of the Board "in the performance of duties pursuant to this Act"? This provision is at the base of
all the rights created by the act.
The second holding of Miranda is equally provocative. The Board
held that "a statutory bargaining representative and an employer
also respectively violates sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3) when, for
arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to
derogate the employment status of an employee."m2 The Board's
25 3 and has been
position here had been hinted at in prior decisions
4
commentators.m
speculated on by numerous
Section 8(b)(2) of the act provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
. . . to cause . . . an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with

respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 25s

How is this to be read in connection with section 8(a) (3)? That
section, in relevant part, makes it an unfair labor practice for an
.employer
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization .

. .

. [N]o employer shall justify any discrimination

against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was not available to
the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
uniformly
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
2
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 5

This language is difficult. What is the difference between (A) and
251. 49 Stat. 456 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 162 (1958).
252. Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 245, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.

253. E.g., Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999, 1016 (1943).

254. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vm.L. L. REv. 151 (1957); Graham,
Taft-Hartley's Enigmatic § 8(b)(2), 1961 LAB. LAw J. 1033; Sovem, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 563 (1962).
255. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958).
256. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958).
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(B)? Assuming there is a difference, why was (B) and not (A)
referred to in 8(b) (2)? Why was there need to refer specifically to
either (A) or (B) in 8(b)(2) when its opening clause refers to all
of 8(a) (3)?
To begin with the last question, it could be argued that specific
mention of the types of discrimination was necessary because a union
was to be held liable not only where there was a reasonable ground
to believe that membership was denied for the given reasons, but
also where membership was denied for those reasons. It was important, that is, to hold a union where membership was denied for
an illegal reason which the discharging employer might not have
suspected.
If this is so, why, referring to the second question above, was (B)
and not (A) of 8(a)(3) included in 8(b)(2)? Could it be that a
union was to be chargeable only when membership had actually been
denied, whereas an employer could be chargeable when such
membership was merely "not available"? Is it possible that the 80th
Congress intended to attach greater culpability to an employer for
the maintenance of improper union security than to the incumbent
union?
Even assuming that some sense can be made out of the above, an
additional problem remains. Section 8(a) (3) proscribes only discrimination which encourages or discourages union membership.
Clauses (A) and (B) merely define the kind of activity that will not
constitute justification for such discrimination. In the second clause
of section 8(b) (2), however, which incorporates clause (B)
of 8(a) (3), to cause discrimination against a nonmember who
has been "denied" membership is an unfair labor practice without
regard to whether such discrimination encourages or discourages
union membership. There is some justification for this. Congress may
well have assumed that when a union causes such discrimination, the
encouragement or discouragement of membership must have been
intended, and may be presumed to result therefrom. But if Congress
explicitly made this assumption with regard to nonmembers and not
with regard to members, how is the Board's assumption in Miranda
and the Supreme Court's assumption in the Radio Officers case25 7
justified, i.e., that encouragement or discouragement with respect to
members may also be inferred from discriminatory union action?
In addition, to show a violation of section 8(b) (2) would a nonmember Negro have to show that he applied for and was denied
membership, or would it be sufficient to show that membership was
not available? If it is not enough to show that membership was not
257. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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available, what do we do with the implicit position of the Supreme
Court in the Radio Officers case that discrimination for purposes of
8 (b) (2), as well as for 8 (a) (3), is actionable where the subject of
discrimination does not have the slightest intention of joining the
union?
If Miranda did not compound these problems arising under sections
8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), it certainly did little to eliminate them. Where
conduct has the "foreseeable result," Miranda tells us, of encouraging
union membership "the finding of a violation may turn upon an
evaluation of the disputed conduct 'in terms of legitimate employer
or union purposes." 258
If this is correct, and if it means anything, must it not also mean
that employer discrimination without a "legitimate" purpose, the
foreseeable result of which is to encourage or discourage union membership, is a violation of the act? And this without regard to whether
the union caused such discrimination or whether the discrimination
was motivated by union animus? If Negroes are discriminated
against as Negroes for the purpose of defeating the union it should
be clear that there is a violation of section 8(a) (3). 2 9 But the
question raised by Miranda is what happens where Negroes are discriminated against as Negroes and there is no union animus connected
with the discrimination but its "foreseeable result" is to encourage or
discourage union membership. What, for example, if an employer
refuses to hire Negroes and the bargaining agent has done nothing
to secure an FEPC clause in the collective bargaining contract? In
terms of the Radio Officers case there is certainly a discouragement to
join that union. What if a Negro employee is subjected to discrimination by the employer as a Negro and the collective bargaining contract has nothing to protect him? In terms of Radio Officers he
is again discouraged. In fact this holding of Miranda may well suggest that any time there is a union on the scene, employer discrimination based on considerations which are not "legitimate" is a violation
of section 8(a) (3). It is certainly not stretching the intent which
Congress had in 1935, when the predecessor to 8(a) (3) was enacted,
to read that any job discrimination which resulted in the encouragement or discouragement of union membership was to be prohibited.
Such is, after all, a fair paraphrase of the statutory language itself,
which bars "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." It is plausible to say that
Radio Officers and Miranda have read "to encourage or discourage'
258. Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 245, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1588.
259. Compare Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1963).
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to mean "the foreseeable result of which is to encourage or discourage.
Whatever merit there may be to this view is not helped by the
standard of "legitimate purpose" that controls it. A standard somewhat less vague would be that employed by the Board in its firstthe fair representation-holding of Miranda, that discrimination is
proscript which is "irrelevant, invidious or unfair."60
Why should not an employer's obligation to abstain from discrimination which encourages or discourages union membership be the
same as the union's obligation under section 7 to abstain from discrimination in bargaining? If anything, the concern of the framers of
sections (8) (3) and 7 was more with the consequences of anti-union
activity than with the evils of majority rule. Moreover, if there is
any symmetry to Taft-Hartley it too would demand this result; that
is, it seems strange to say that the standards for discrimination in
section 8(b) (2) and under section 7 differ. And it would be even
stranger to say that the standards for discrimination under sections
8(a) (3) and 8(b)(2) differ, since in this regard the wording of the
two sections is virtually the same.
What the Board will do with Miranda is of course speculative.
Until recently it has consistently hewed to the standard position:
discrimination because of race alone is not a violation of section
8 (a) (3). Thus, in Young's Motor Freight Lines261 the Board found
that the discharge of Negro employees because "they were objectionable to some of Respondents customers clearly antedated the commencement of the dischargee's union activity." It was, therefore, not
a violation. And in Peerless Quarries,Inc.,2 2 where the enforcement
of an invalid union security clause was held to be an unfair labor
practice, the Board emphasized that they did not find that an individual discharged under that clause was entitled to protection because
he was a Negro.2
But the possibility of a different approach following Miranda cannot be discounted.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Board's recent activity in the area of fair employment practices
has been, on the whole, justifiable in terms of the doctrines of neutrality, fair representation and Shelley v. Kraemer. It can be argued that
260. Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 245, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
261. 91 N.L.R.B. 1430 (1950).
262. 92 N.L.R.B. 1194, enforced, 193 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1951).
263. See also Administrative Ruling N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel, Case No. 1047, 35
L.R.R.M. 1130 (1954).
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a more forthright adoption of the Shelley rationale would avoid
difficult problems of statutory construction, as in the case of decertification. This approach might enable the Board to go further in
that area or the contract bar area than the doctrine of fair representation will permit and further than the "inflammatory" standard
will permit in the election area. It can also be argued, with respect to
both an appeal to prejudice and the failure to represent fairly as
unfair labor practices, that neutral principles of general application
could take the Board further than it has yet moved.
But in considering the outer limits of justifiable doctrine, other
factors cannot be ignored. The mentality, the administrative apparatus and the staff limitations of the NLRB, and the broad discretionary
powers of its general counsel, make it a very poor substitute for an
FEPC. Though it may become an adequate gadfly with respect to
dramatizing the nature and extent of employment discrimination, too
great a reliance on administrative inventiveness can be harmful, not
only in terms of dissipating Board resources needed in other areas, but
also in terms of funneling civil rights energies into what may well
turn out to be a blind alley.

